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Highlights 
1. What is already known about this topic? 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are incentivised to develop orphan drugs which are often 
recommended by the NHS despite exceeding conventional thresholds of cost-effectiveness. 
Previous population surveys suggest little support for the preferential funding of orphan drugs but 
these are influenced by framing effects. 
 
2. What does the paper add to existing knowledge? 
The UK general public does not consider rarity in itself as being sufficient to justify special 
consideration for additional NHS funding. 
Based on public preferences, only five of twelve recently approved orphan drugs would be 
recommended for NHS use. 
 
3. What insights does the paper provide for informing health care-related decision making? 
Policymakers should be cautious when determining special funding status for orphan drugs. 
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Abstract 
Background 
It is unclear whether UK National Health Service policies for orphan drugs, which permit funding of 
non-cost-effective treatments, reflect societal preferences. 
Methods 
We conducted person trade off (PTO) and discrete choice experiments (DCE) among 3,950 adults 
selected to be representative of the UK general population. Experimental design was informed by 
surveys of patients affected by rare diseases, their carers, healthcare staff and policy-makers. 
Societal preferences were estimated in relation to treating a common disease, increases in waiting 
lists, or filling of vacant NHS posts. Results of the DCE were applied to recently licensed orphan 
drugs. 
Results 
Based on equal cost, the majority of respondents to the PTO (54%; 95%CI, 50,59) chose to allocate 
funds equally between patients treated for rare and common diseases, with 32% (28,36) favouring 
rare over common (14%; 11,17), which this reduced to 23% (20,27) when rare disease treatments 
were 10-times more expensive. When framed differently, more respondents prioritised not increasing 
waiting list size (43%; 39,48) than to treat rare disease patients (34%; 30,38). 
The DCE indicated a greater preference for treating a common disease over a rare disease. 
Respondents agreed with 5 of 12 positive appraisal recommendations for orphan drugs, even if their 
list price was higher, but preferred the NHS not to fund the remainder.  
Conclusions 
The general public does not value rarity as a sufficient reason to justify special consideration for 
additional NHS funding of orphan drugs. This has implications regarding the appropriateness of 
operating higher thresholds of cost-effectiveness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Orphan medicinal products include treatments for rare diseases which are life-threatening or 
chronically debilitating, and medicines whose development would not be commercially viable without 
incentives [1]. Legislations aimed at promoting the development of orphan medicinal products have 
succeeded to the extent that regulatory approval rates are at their highest. Orphan drugs accounted 
for 40% of new drug approvals in Europe and the USA in 2016 [2,3]. However, ensuring patient 
access to these medicines has posed significant difficulties for policy makers given their high cost [4] 
and lack of cost-effectiveness [5]. 
Concerns about inequity of care –patients being denied effective treatment on the basis of the rarity of 
their disease– has led to specific NHS policies to facilitate access to many orphan drugs. These 
include the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)’s Highly Specialised 
Technologies programme which operates a higher threshold for cost-effectiveness (up to £300,000 
per quality-adjusted life-year, QALY) [6], and the Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC) and the All 
Wales Medicines Strategy Group’s (AWMSG) permissive policies for appraising orphan drugs [7,8]. 
Each organisation justifies the value of non-cost-effective orphan drugs on the basis of particular 
patient, disease or drug feature. These include the magnitude of treatment benefit, the severity of 
disease, the innovative nature of the drug and availability of alternative treatment. There is evidence 
of general population support for prioritising patients with greater disease severity as well as 
interventions that generate larger health gains [9]. There is also evidence that the general population 
prefers funds to be allocated towards innovations that are scientifically proven and have potential 
health benefits [10]. Unmet need, however, is only considered important from a personal perspective, 
and not from a public perspective [11]. The implication of considering these factors in choices 
concerning investment in new medicines but not in the services they displace, however, is the 
inequitable position of improvements in health being valued higher in orphan conditions than in others 
[12,13]. 
The value judgements of members of society are important in determining the guiding principles of 
priority setting [14]. NICE involves the public through its citizens’ councils which formulate a view on 
specific topics. A council discussion on ultra-rare diseases found that rarity is not a factor in itself that 
should warrant additional funding [15]. Previous studies of societal preference conducted in the UK 
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[16] and internationally [17-20] have also found no evidence of a preference to fund high cost 
treatments for rare diseases on the basis of rarity alone.  While consistent in their findings, these 
studies have been criticised for being reliant on one method of preference elicitation, potential framing 
effects affecting the sensitivity of respondents’ choices to the questions posed or method used [21], 
inappropriateness of how opportunity cost is presented to those surveyed [18], and consideration of 
other features of rare diseases besides prevalence. 
We aimed to assess whether there is a UK societal preference to support current NHS policies that 
justify the acceptance of the opportunity cost associated with the funding of treatments for rare 
diseases. We further tested whether a sample of recently approved orphan drugs would be 
recommended based on societal preference. 
METHODS 
We utilised two separate preference elicitation techniques: a person trade off (PTO) study and a 
discrete choice experiment (DCE). Both methodologies involve respondents trading between options 
to estimate their preference, but they allow respondents to engage in the decision-making process in 
different ways. The PTO method asks respondents to select the number of patients that they would 
prefer the NHS to allocate resources to, choosing between two populations or scenarios of health 
service provision. This allows the opportunity cost of the allocation choice to be transparent and 
unambiguous to facilitate estimation of distributive weighting (i.e. who to treat) [22]. DCEs describe 
hypothetical but realistic medicines for rare and common diseases by their characteristics (attributes) 
and associated levels [23]. Respondent choices are then modelled to reveal the importance of the 
attributes and the willingness of respondents to trade attributes and levels. 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Health Care and Medical Sciences Academic Ethics 
Committee, Bangor University 2015-02-03. 
PTO survey design 
Four PTO scenarios were designed. Two represented a ‘zero-sum’ frame: (i) a scenario based on 
cost, of trading patients with a rare and common disease; and (ii) a scenario in which both treatment 
costs and benefits were varied; and two represented impacts of additional costs on the provision of 
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healthcare in terms of: (iii) an increased waiting list for an unspecified treatment; and (iv) leaving 
vacant NHS staff posts unfilled. 
In the first two scenarios, the costs of rare disease medicines ranged between 1 and 20 times the cost 
of medicines for common diseases, to represent realistic values. In the waiting list scenario, we varied 
the benefits of both the rare disease medicine and the treatment for which patients are waiting, as 
well as their respective costs. Choices concerning staffing levels were based on the salaries of a 
health care assistant (1:5) or a nurse (1:3) relative to a doctor. The levels for this scenario were varied 
by staffing level standards; labelled as normal levels, overstaffed and understaffed. 
A focus group of 8 members of the public was convened to examine the face validity of the PTO 
survey. 
DCE survey design 
We followed good practice guidelines to design the experiments [23,24].  Potential attributes of 
relevance to rare disease medicines were identified from a systematic review [25]. These were 
presented to four stakeholder groups using an online survey (Surveymonkey): patients with rare 
diseases, their carers, clinicians and allied health professionals, and NHS decision-makers.  Each 
participant was also given an opportunity to suggest their own attribute, and then asked to rank all 
attributes they believed were important for the NHS to consider in funding decisions concerning 
orphan drugs.  Aggregate ranking was summarised using Borda scores [26], calculated for each 
group and for all participants. 
The identified attributes were presented to a separate focus group of 8 members of the public to 
decide on the final list of attributes and to refine the format and language used in the DCE. Members 
also discussed options for attribute levels and confirmed the final selection which was based on 
criteria for orphan drug designation [1], published evidence on the effectiveness and costs of orphan 
drugs [4], and change in health status, based on the EuroQol EQ-5D health outcome measure [27]. 
The DCE attributes and levels are presented in Table 1. A full factorial design would result in 108 
profiles and 5,778 possible pairwise choice scenarios; hence, a fractional factorial design selected 
from a design catalogue [28] was selected to reduce burden on respondents. 
Insert Table 1 here 
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Study sample  
Patients and carers participating in the stakeholder survey were recruited via rare disease patient 
support groups. Clinicians and allied health professionals caring for patients with rare diseases were 
identified via Orphanet or their membership of NHS rare disease centres of excellence. NHS policy 
decision-makers were defined as members of NICE, AWMSG and SMC appraisal committees. 
Recruitment to the focus group was based on local advertising. Interested persons were included if 
they were a UK citizen, aged 18 years or over, had no diagnosis of a rare disease, or history of being 
refused funding for NHS treatment. Target sample size across all groups was 120 participants. 
The population survey aimed to recruit 4,000 respondents representative of the general population in 
the UK, recruited by a market research company (Belindi). Participants were compensated by way of 
reward points which they can trade for goods. 
Survey administration 
In designing the questionnaires, we were cognisant of respondents’ likely unfamiliarity of rare 
diseases, and the high cost of orphan drugs. We were also conscious that respondents may have 
limited motivation to participate in the research and that an online survey offered no opportunities for 
clarification and so may not be interpreted correctly. We therefore designed an animation to 
accompany the survey, with input from focus group members (available online from 
https://tinyurl.com/OrphansAnimation). 
Both studies were piloted amongst a convenient sample of 12 staff and students at Bangor University. 
Piloting involved feedback on the instructions, layout and images used in the PTO and DCE, and 
resulted in some images being subsequently modified. 
Participants in the main survey were required to view the animation before proceeding. They were 
reminded that there were no right or wrong answers, and that the research was to determine their 
views on how the NHS should prioritise treatments. They were directed at random to complete either 
the PTO or DCE questionnaire. Participants directed to the PTO survey were allocated at random to 
complete one of the four scenarios and asked to imagine that they were a decision maker for their 
local NHS health authority with a fixed budget. The final survey question asked whether or not 
respondents would prefer the NHS to fund patients with rare diseases knowing that if they chose to do 
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so, funding would be reduced in other areas. DCE participants were presented with a labelled choice 
of a treatment for a rare or common disease and asked which treatment they believe the NHS should 
fund. Respondents were blocked into 3 DCE surveys with 9 pairwise choice tasks in each.  
An example of both the PTO and DCE is presented in figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
Analysis  
PTO responses were analysed according to simple majority, and by the ratio of means (ROM) method 
[29], where a value of 1 is assigned to the most preferred choice, and 1 𝑁𝑖
⁄  assigned to the least, 
where Ni is the number of patients in the least preferred group that is equal to one patient in the most 
preferred group. Values of ROM>1 indicate higher social weights for populations receiving rare 
disease treatment. Respondents who chose an equal allocation of funds to both populations were 
excluded from the ROM analysis, to prevent over estimation of the weights.  
Discrete choice experiment data were analysed using a random effects logit model that allowed for 
repeated observations from the same respondent [30, 31].  A linear utility function was defined 
according to: 
𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  𝛽1 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽4 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑠 +  𝛽5 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 + 𝛽6 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
× 𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝑒 
An interaction term was included to account for cost levels being different for each drug treatment 
label. The size and significance of the coefficients indicate the relative importance of each attribute.  
The pre-defined sub-groups (age, sex, socioeconomic status and country) were analysed by 
comparison with the base-case model using log likelihood tests at 5% level of significance.  
We assessed whether respondents’ preferences were in agreement with NICE, SMC or AWMSG 
recommendations of orphan drugs approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) during 2014-
16. This was done by implementing the DCE model using data specific to each drug to calculate total 
utility. Evidence on whether each drug was for a rare and life-threatening or chronically debilitating 
disease, as well as whether other drug treatments were available were based on information on the 
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EMA website.  We sourced data on cost and incremental gains in life-years and QALYs from 
economic assessments included in submissions to each HTA organisation. QALY gains exceeding 1 
were assumed to represent a return to everyday life activities. We defined a preference for NHS 
reimbursement of a given drug if the total utility was positive.  The value-based price of the drug was 
determined as the price at which the utility of the drug is zero. 
All data were analysed in STATA (version 13, StataCorp LP, College Station, TX). 
RESULTS 
Stakeholder survey 
Forty-five patients, 14 informal carers, 16 healthcare professionals, and 24 policy makers participated 
in the stakeholder survey.  Patients and carers were consistent in their selection of their most 
important attributes, with the debilitating or life threatening nature of the disease, therapeutic 
improvement to everyday life, magnitude of treatment benefit, and evidence of effectiveness featuring 
in their top 5. Healthcare professionals and policy makers each considered evidence of cost 
effectiveness in their top 5 attributes (Table 1). The overall ranking across groups was: evidence of 
effectiveness (=1), the debilitating or life threatening nature of the disease (=1), improvements to 
everyday life (2), magnitude of treatment benefit (3), cost effectiveness (4) and availability of 
alternative treatments (5).  A decision was made to substitute the cost effectiveness attribute for a 
cost attribute to avoid double counting effectiveness and reduce cognitive burden on DCE 
respondents. 
Focus group 
The potential attribute concerning the evidence for effectiveness was not easily interpreted by focus 
group discussants, was given least priority and was therefore excluded from the final DCE design. 
The issue of cost dominated the discussion. Most participants argued that more information was 
needed to see the “whole picture of spending on the NHS” and that the figures presented may be “out 
of context”. Some focus group participants were reluctant to engage in a discussion they felt meant 
putting a cost on peoples’ lives but did feel that it was too important to be ignored. Consensus was 
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reached when an example DCE was presented to the group which included visual aids. This reduced 
participants’ concerns about the context in which the survey would be presented.  
Focus group participants stated that they had sufficient information on the differences between rare 
and common diseases and were able to complete the survey without assistance when presented with 
a mock version of both the DCE and PTO. 
Survey of the general public 
A total of 3,950 adults completed the questionnaires. Respondents to both surveys were broadly 
representative of the UK adult general population (Table 2).  
Insert Table 2 here 
Person trade off  
Based on equal cost and treatment benefit, the majority of respondents (54%; 95% confidence 
interval, 50, 59) chose to allocate funds equally between the two groups (Table 3). Traders favoured 
treating patients with a rare disease (32%; 95% CI, 28, 36) over patients with a common disease 
(14%; 95% CI, 11, 17). Preference for treating rare disease patients reduced to 23% (95% CI, 20, 27) 
and 19% (95% CI, 16, 23), respectively, in the context of orphan drugs being 10- and 20- times more 
expensive. When the benefit of rare disease treatments reduced, there was more support for treating 
patients with common diseases. 
Insert Table 3 here 
ROM increased from 2.67 assuming equal cost and benefit, to 8.97 when a rare disease treatment 
costs the same but is more effective than a common disease treatment. However, the strength of 
respondents’ preferences towards rare disease treatments reduced as their cost increased by 10- and 
20-fold, with the social weight for a more effective treatment reducing to 1.60 and 1.42, respectively. 
When we changed the framing of the question to reflect the opportunity cost of funding treatments for 
rare diseases in terms of increasing waiting lists, the majority of respondents prioritised either not 
increasing waiting list size (43%; 95% CI, 39, 48) or equal allocation of funds (23%; 95% CI, 19, 26) 
than treatment of rare disease patients (34%; 95% CI, 30, 38). More respondents favoured not to 
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increase waiting list as the cost of rare disease treatment increased, but this was reversed for rare 
disease treatments of higher effectiveness, even when cost increased 10- and 20-fold. 
Opportunity cost represented in terms of staffing implications followed a similar trend. Only when a 
hospital was already overstaffed did respondents’ preferences switch to treating a patient with a rare 
disease over filling vacant staff posts. 
Statement on resource allocation 
Responses to the supplementary question indicated that the majority 61% (95% CI, 58, 64) would 
prefer for the NHS not to reduce funding in other areas in order for money to be available to pay for 
drugs for rare diseases.  
Discrete choice experiment 
Treatment for a rare disease was preferred in 37% of choice tasks. Each of the five attributes 
significantly influenced respondents’ choice between treatments for a rare versus common disease 
(Table 4). All else being equal, the odds of preferring funding to be allocated towards rare disease 
treatments increased by 2.35 (95% CI, 2.24, 2.47) for survival advantages of 1 or more years, and 
1.19 (95% CI, 1.12, 1.27) for a disease which is debilitating or life threatening. Respondents indicated 
they would not want to prioritise NHS funding based on: whether the disease was rare, no availability 
of other drug treatment, or on the basis of cost. There was a preference to fund medicines that 
provide large benefit and which improve quality of life. 
Insert Table 4 here 
Analysis of sub-groups did not show any statistically significant difference from the base case 
(Supplementary data).  
Twenty-two orphan drugs were approved in 2014-16, of which 2 were subsequently withdrawn from 
the register of orphan medicinal products and 7 had not been appraised by NICE, SMC or AWMSG. 
All remaining 13 orphan drugs were for a rare and life-threatening or chronically debilitating disease 
and, with the exception of ataluren for Duchenne muscular dystrophy, were for a disease where an 
alternative drug treatment was available. Based on public preferences for NHS funding, a positive 
utility was estimated for 5 of the 12 orphan drugs which received a positive recommendation by NICE, 
SMC or AWMSG (Table 5). Respondents’ preferences indicated that the NHS should consider each 
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of these acceptable at annual prices exceeding £250,000 per patient per year or more, which 
represents up to a 5-fold increase on their list prices. Eliglustat for Gaucher disease type 1 was 
associated with a negative utility at its list price of £250,000 per patient per year, but a 9-fold reduction 
in price to £27,705 would make this an acceptable option for NHS funding. The remaining 
recommended drugs were each associated with a negative utility and were not preferred at any price 
(value-based price <£0 per patient per year). A negative utility was determined for the only orphan 
drug (daratumumab) which was not recommended by SMC (but has yet to be appraised by NICE or 
AWMSG). 
Insert Table 5 here 
DISCUSSION 
This study shows that the UK general public does not consider rarity in itself as being sufficient to 
justify special preferential NHS funding.  Respondents were willing for the NHS to pay more per year 
of treatment for those affected by a common disease than those with a rare disease. They also 
showed a large preference for attributes that are independent of disease prevalence, specifically, 
whether a treatment improves everyday life or prolongs survival. However, both methods of 
preference elicitation suggest that the general public is willing for the NHS to preferentially fund 
treatments for patients with rare diseases when treatment benefit is greater than that of its common 
disease counterpart. But posed with more realistic scenarios of NHS opportunity cost, respondents 
preferred funding to be directed towards not increasing waiting lists and tackling staff shortages. The 
utility model indicated a preference for funding of only one NHS approved orphan drug that received 
market authorisation during 2014-16. There was no price at which treatments that were associated 
with a negative utility would be preferred. 
The finding of a lack of preference towards NHS funding being allocated to treatments for rare 
diseases on the basis of rarity alone is aligned with previous research.  Five large PTOs of the UK 
[16], Norwegian [17], Canadian [18], Australian [19], and Swedish [20] general public each failed to 
demonstrate evidence for societal preference if funding decisions were at the expense of treatment 
being available to patients with common diseases. Similar findings were found among doctors [32], in 
a convenience sample of university students [33], as well as by the NICE citizens’ council [15]. 
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Responses to preference elicitation studies, however, are sensitive to the framing effects of how 
choices are presented [21]. Offering respondents the choice between two competing populations, the 
‘zero-sum’ frame, may not represent the opportunity cost in terms which are easily understood by the 
general public [32] or which reflect reality. In order to make the PTO exercise more familiar to those 
surveyed, and more closely aligned with NHS decisions, we included two scenarios relating to waiting 
lists and staffing levels. We further included a discrete choice experiment as an alternative method of 
preference elicitation, and obtained results that were consistent across all scenarios and methods. 
To our knowledge, our study is the first to elicit preferences from the general population on prioritising 
orphan drugs using DCE, and to use systematic methods to select attributes that were relevant and 
meaningful to the general public. However, as with other revealed preference studies, a number of 
simplifying assumptions were made to reduce the burden on respondents. To convey the concept of 
treatment benefit, the PTO presented the rare disease treatment to be more or less beneficial than 
the treatment for common disease. The DCE considered treatment benefit in terms of achievement of 
1 or more years of extended survival and improvement in everyday life activities. While both 
approaches are simplified representations of benefit that are easily understood, they capture limited 
aspects of treatment effect, and were dependent on assumptions relating to QALY gains.  Neither 
survey accounted for the uncertainty of treatment benefit; and the scenario of returning a patient to 
normal everyday life may be unrealistic and overstate the effectiveness of orphan drugs, considering 
the serious and debilitating nature of these diseases. 
The value-based pricing model is driven primarily by attributes capturing treatment benefit in terms of 
quality of life and survival, but as variables representing these are dichotomous, the model may 
overestimate the value of a drug in relation to its benefits. Nevertheless it provides a basis for 
capturing societal preferences to inform decisions on orphan drug funding allocation, and what 
constitutes a fair price. 
Since April 2017, NICE has new arrangements for evaluating orphan drugs that fall within the Highly 
Specialised Technologies programme. These include increasing the threshold value to £100,000 per 
QALY (and where transformational improvements to health, to £300,000 per QALY) [6]. This would 
place the value of health gains in rare diseases up 15 times higher than equivalent gains in common 
diseases. Our results – confirming those of others [16-20] – indicate that there is no societal 
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preference for higher valuation of orphan drugs, whose sole distinctive attribute is rarity [10]. 
Policymakers should therefore be cautious when determining special funding status for orphan drugs 
especially given the increase in their numbers, cost [34], and the profitability of their manufacturers 
[35]. 
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Table 1. Discrete choice experiment attributes and levels 
Attribute Attribute 
description  
Ranking by 
patients (P), 
carers (C), 
healthcare 
professionals 
(HCP), policy 
makers (PM); 
overall rank  
(OR) 
Levels Rationale for level 
Debilitating or life 
threatening 
The disease affects 
patients’ everyday life 
OR the patient could 
die if they do not 
receive treatment 
P: 2 
C: 1 
HCP: 3 
PM: 5 
OR: 1 
Yes  
No  
Focus group members identified a wide range of 
symptoms that could be used for this attribute. 
However, to simplify the task, we adopted the EC 
definition for orphan drug designation (1), which 
requires the condition to be life-threatening or 
chronically debilitating. 
Improvements to 
everyday life 
The drug improves 
the well-being of 
patients and their 
P: 1 
C: 2 
HCP: 4 
Returns patient to normal 
everyday life 
Based on the usual activities domain of the EQ-
5D-3L. 
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families e.g. school/ 
work social activities 
PM: >5 
OR: 2 
Some improvement to 
everyday life 
No improvement to 
everyday life 
Treatment benefit 
Extent to which the 
drug increase survival 
P: 3 
C: 3 
HCP: 2 
PM: 4 
OR: 3 
Increases survival by <1 
year 
Increases survival by ≥1 
year 
Based on the evidence of effectiveness of orphan 
drugs (4). One year was chosen to represent a 
transformational health benefit. 
Cost per patient 
per year* 
Cost of treatment on 
the NHS per patient 
per year 
P: >5 
C: >5 
HCP: 5 
PM: 2 
OR: 4 
 
Rare:  
£5,000, £60,000, £200,000 
Low-cost orphan drugs (e.g. ibuprofen, caffeine, 
sildenafil) 
Middle-cost is the average annual, per-patient cost 
of orphan drugs (4) 
High cost ultra-orphan drug (e.g. enzyme 
replacement therapies for lysosomal storage 
diseases)   
Common:  
£500, £2,000, £9,000 
 
Low-cost representative of the annual cost of 
branded treatments (e.g. direct oral 
anticoagulants) 
20 
 
Middle-cost (e.g. pregabalin) 
High cost representative of commonly used 
biologics (e.g. adalimumab) 
Availability of 
other drug 
treatments 
Other drug treatments 
are available to treat 
the disease 
P: >5 
C: 5 
HCP: >5 
PM: 3 
OR: 5 
Yes- a drug is available to 
treat the cause of the 
disease  
No, but patients’ symptoms 
are treated 
Many orphan drugs fulfil the EC regulation (1) on 
orphan medicinal products of there being no 
satisfactory alternative treatment. Treatment of 
symptoms reflects the NHS provision of best 
supportive care if no other alternative treatment 
exists. Drugs available to treat the cause of 
diseases capture targeted therapies such as 
ivacaftor for cystic fibrosis. 
 
*Described as cost-effectiveness in the ranking exercise 
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Table 2. Sociodemographic characteristics 
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 DCE 
number (%) 
PTO 
number (%) 
United Kingdom 
(%) 
Number of responses 1940 2000  
Female1 970 (49.7) 1036 (51.8) 50.8 
Age1    
18-24 106 (5.4) 131 (6.5) 7.2 
25-34 311 (15.9) 338 (16.9) 13.5 
35-44 381 (19.5) 385 (19.2) 12.9 
45-54 399 (20.4) 385 (19.2) 14.1 
55-64 313 (16.0) 320 (16.9) 11.3 
65+ 440 (22.5) 441 (22.0) 23.0 
Household income (£ per annum)2 
Under 19,999 546 (28.0) 522 (26.1) 29.1 
20,000-39,000 641 (32.9) 670 (33.5) 31.3 
40,000-59,000 285 (14.3) 308 (15.4) 12.2 
60,000-79,000 133 (6.8) 133 (6.6) 8.4 
80,000-99,000 53 (2.7) 56 (2.8) 6.6 
100,000-119,000 28 (1.4) 22 (1.1) 5.5 
120,000-149,999 9 (0.5) 14 (0.7) 
7.0 
150,000+ 6 (0.3) 11 (0.6) 
Don’t know 39 (2.0) 47 (2.4)  
Prefer not to say 210 (10.7) 217 (10.8)  
Social Grade3 
AB, C1  1166 (60.0) 1028 (51.0) 53.0 
C2, DE 784 (40.0) 792 (48.0) 47.0 
Household composition4 
With children  610 (31.0) 668 (33.3) 28.0 
Without children  1340 (69.0) 1332 (66.7) 72.0 
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1UK data from the Office for National Statistics Population Estimates Summary for the UK, mid-2014 
2UK data estimated from the Office for National Statistics UK household income and wealth, 2013/14 
3UK data from the Office for National Statistics UK census 2011, 
4UK data from the Office for National Statistics General Lifestyle Survey, 2011  
 
Country 1 
Northern Ireland  27 (1.3) 26 (1.3) 2.8 
Wales 96 (4.9) 101 (5.0) 4.8 
Scotland 127 (6.5) 142 (7.1) 8.2 
England  1700 (87.2) 1731 (87.0) 84.0 
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Table 3. Results of the person trade off experiment 
 Proportion 
preference to 
rare 
(95% CI) 
Equal allocation 
of funds 
(95% CI) 
Proportion 
preference to 
alternative 
(95% CI) 
ROM 
(number in 
analysis) 
Scenarios for common disease treatment, based on the rare disease treatment being: 
Equal cost  0.32  
(0.28, 0.36) 
0.54 
(0.50, 0.59) 
0.14  
(0.11, 0.17) 
2.11 
(228) 
5x higher cost 0.31 
(0.27, 0.35) 
0.31 
(0.27, 0.35) 
0.39 
(0.34, 0.43) 
0.68 
(346) 
10x higher cost 0.23 
(0.20, 0.27) 
0.25 
(0.21, 0.29) 
0.51 
(0.46, 0.55) 
0.43 
(375) 
20x higher cost 0.19 
(0.16, 0.23) 
0.25 
(0.21, 0.29) 
0.56 
(0.51, 0.60) 
0.35 
(375) 
Scenarios for common disease treatment, based on the rare disease treatment being: 
Equal cost, and less effective 0.23 
(0.20, 0.27) 
0.26 
(0.22, 0.30) 
0.51 
(0.46, 0.55) 
0.75 
(370) 
Equal cost, and equally effective 0.29 
(0.25, 0.33) 
0.59 
(0.54, 0.63) 
0.12 
(0.10, 0.15) 
2.67 
(206) 
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Equal cost, and more effective 0.71 
(0.67, 0.75) 
0.20 
(0.17, 0.24) 
0.08 
(0.06, 0.11) 
8.97 
(399) 
10x higher cost and less effective 0.17 
(0.14, 0.21) 
0.18 
(0.15, 0.21) 
0.65 
(0.61, 0.69) 
0.27 
(410) 
10x higher cost and equally effective 0.23 
(0.20, 0.27) 
0.33 
 (0.29, 0.37) 
0.44 
(0.39, 0.48) 
0.51 
(335) 
10x higher cost and more effective 0.50 
(0.46, 0.54) 
0.28  
(0.24, 0.32) 
0.22 
(0.18, 0.25) 
1.60 
(358) 
20x higher cost and less effective 0.18 
(0.14, 0.21) 
0.17 
(0.14, 0.20) 
0.65 
(0.61, 0.69) 
0.27 
(415) 
20x higher cost and equally effective 0.19 
(0.16, 0.23) 
0.27 
(0.23, 0.30) 
0.54 
(0.50, 0.58) 
0.36 
(367) 
20x higher cost and more effective 0.44 
(0.39, 0.48) 
0.30 
(0.26, 0.34) 
0.26 
(0.23, 0.30) 
1.42 
(351) 
Waiting list scenarios, based on the rare disease treatment being: 
Equal cost, and less effective than treatment being waited for 0.34 
(0.30, 0.38) 
0.23 
(0.19, 0.26) 
0.43 
(0.39, 0.48) 
5.11 
(272) 
Equal cost, and equally effective as treatment being waited for 0. 45 
(0.41, 0.49) 
0.46 
(0.41, 0.50) 
0.09 
(0.07, 0.12) 
1.09 
(387) 
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Equal cost, and more effective than treatment being waited for 0.68 
(0.64, 0.72) 
0.22 
(0.19, 0.26) 
0.10 
(0.07, 0.13) 
7.19 
(389) 
10x higher cost, and less effective than treatment being waited for 0.33 
(0.29, 0.37) 
0.26 
(0.23, 0.30) 
0.41 
(0.36, 0.45) 
0.72 
(386) 
10x higher cost, and equally effective than treatment being waited for 0.30 
(0.26, 0.34) 
0.17 
(0.14, 0.21) 
0.53 
(0.48, 0.57) 
0.53 
(414) 
10x higher cost, and more effective than treatment being waited for 0.51 
(0.47, 0.56) 
0.27 
(0.23, 0.31) 
0.22 
(0.18, 0.25) 
1.63 
(365) 
20x higher cost, and less effective than treatment being waited for 0.25 
(0.22, 0.29) 
0.15 
(0.12, 0.18) 
0.59 
(0.55, 0.64) 
0.64 
(424) 
20x higher cost, and equally effective than treatment being waited for 0.32 
(0.28, 0.36) 
0.22 
(0.18, 0.25) 
0.48 
(0.43, 0.52) 
0.42 
(398) 
20x higher cost, and more effective than treatment being waited for 0.43 
(0.38, 0.47) 
0.25 
(0.21, 0.29) 
0.32 
(0.28, 0.36) 
1.19 
(374) 
Staffing scenarios, based on the cost of rare disease treatment being equivalent to: 
3 nurses (understaffed) 0.29 
(0.25, 0.33) 
0.28 
(0.24, 0.32) 
0.44 
(0.39, 0.48) 
0.63 
(362) 
3 nurses (normal staffing) 0.31 
(0.27, 0.35) 
0.34 
(0.30, 0.39) 
0.34 
(0.30, 0.39) 
0.83 
(328) 
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3 nurses (overstaffed) 0.44 
(0.40, 0.49) 
0.31 
(0.27, 0.35) 
0.25 
(0.21, 0.29) 
1.42 
(346) 
5 healthcare assistants (understaffed) 0.25 
(0.21, 0.29) 
0.24 
(0.20, 0.28) 
0.51 
(0.47, 0.56) 
0.48 
(381) 
5 healthcare assistants (normal staffing) 0.33 
(0.29, 0.37) 
0.30 
(0.26, 0.34) 
0.38 
(0.33, 0.42) 
0.76 
(352) 
5 healthcare assistants (overstaffed) 0.52 
(0.48, 0.56) 
0.21 
(0.17, 0.25) 
0.27 
(0.23, 0.31) 
1.35 
(395) 
1 doctor (understaffed) 0.24 
(0.20, 0.28) 
0.23 
(0.20, 0.27) 
0.53 
(0.49, 0.57) 
0.73 
(384) 
1 doctor (normal staffing) 0.33 
(0.29, 0.37) 
0.27 
(0.23, 0.31) 
0.40 
(0.35, 0.44) 
1.12 
(363) 
1 doctor (overstaffed) 0.50 
(0.46, 0.55) 
0.21 
(0.18, 0.25) 
0.28 
(0.24, 0.32) 
2.09 
(393) 
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Table 4. Results of the discrete choice experiment 
 
Attribute Coefficient 
(95% confidence 
interval) 
Odds ratio 
(95% confidence 
interval) 
Rare disease treatment -0.52 
(-0.57, -0.47) 
0.59 
(0.56, 0.62) 
Cost of treatment (thousands) -0.022 
(-0.028, -0.017) 
1.00 
(1.00, 1.00) 
Debilitating or life threatening disease 0.18 
(0.11, 0.24) 
1.19 
(1.12, 1.27) 
Availability of other drug treatment -0.075 
(-0.123, -0.025) 
0.93 
(0.88, 0.97) 
Treatment benefit 0.86 
(0.81, 0.91) 
2.35 
(2.24, 2.47) 
Improvements to everyday life 
None 
-0.052 
(-0.076, -0.027) 
0.95 
(0.93, 0.97) 
Some 0.39  
Returns patients to normal activities 0.66 
(0.63, 0.70) 
1.94 
(1.87, 2.00) 
Interaction term 
cost x rare disease treatment  
0.019 
(0.015, 0.023) 
1.00 
(1.00, 1.00) 
Constant  -0.14 
(-0.19, -0.09) 
 
Number of observations 35100  
AIC 42720.09  
BIC 42804.75  
Model χ2 0.0000  
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Table 5. Total utility and value-based pricing estimates for orphan drugs 
Drug Orphan indication Modelled 
evidence  
LYG 
Modelled 
evidence  
ΔQALY* 
Cost per 
patient per year 
(£)** 
Total utility 
(95% confidence 
interval) 
Value-based 
price (£) 
Obeticholic acid Primary biliary 
cholangitis 
4.43 5.83 29,005 0.78 (0.76, 0.79) 
265,212 
Ibrutinib Mantle cell 
lymphoma  
1.01 0.94 85,848 0.75 (0.73, 0.83) 
265,212 
Blinatumomab Neuroblastoma 1.75 1.5 104,884 0.58 (0.55, 0.59) 265,212 
Trametinib Melanoma 1.65 1.30 110,880 0.56 (0.53, 0.57) 265,212 
Ataluren Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy 
>1 5.17 246,448 0.14 (0.14, 0.19) 
285,947 
Olaparib Epithelial ovarian 
cancer 
1.17 0.89 51,350 -0.50 (-0.52, -0.47) 
<0 
Eliglustat Gaucher disease 
type 1 
0 1.05 249,999 -0.80 (-0.87, -0.70) 
27,705 
Lenvatinib Thyroid cancer 0.79 N/A 52,307 -0.80 (-0.83, -0.73) <0 
Ibrutinib Chronic lymphocytic 
leukaemia  
>1 >2 55,955 -0.92 (-0.98, -0.86) 
<0 
Nintedanib Idiopathic pulmonary 
fibrosis 
0.03 0.05 26,100 -1.27 (-1.28, -1.22) 
<0 
Panobinostat Multiple myeloma 0.21 0.12 111,840 -1.57 (-1.59, -1.57) <0 
Migalastat Fabry disease 0 0.34 210,000 -1.93 (-1.95, -1.89) <0 
Daratumumab Multiple myeloma >0.25 0.58 103,680 -1.54 (-1.56, -1.54) <0 
 
*QALY gains >0 but <1 were assumed to reflect an improvement in everyday activities; QALY gains >1 (or if no data available, N/A) were assumed to reflect a 
return to usual activities 
**Based on list price; a confidential discounted price based on a patient-access scheme is available for many of the drugs listed 
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Figure 1. An example of a discrete choice experiment choice (left) and patient trade off exercise (right) presented to those surveyed. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY DATA 
S1 Table. Sub-group analysis by region  
Attribute Coefficient 
(95% confidence interval) 
 Scotland England Northern Ireland & 
Wales 
Rare disease -0.4473* 
(0.6383, 0.2563) 
-0.5322* 
(-0.5866, -0.4778) 
-0.4617* 
( -0.6674, -0.2560) 
Cost of treatment  -1.78x-05* 
(-3.36e-05, -2.11e-06) 
  -2.34e-05* 
(-2.77e-05, -1.91e-05) 
-1.51e-05 
(-2.99e-05, -3.74e-07) 
Debilitating and life 
threatening disease 
0.1561 
(-0.0765, 0.3888) 
0.1713* 
(0.1021, 0.2405) 
0.2975 
(0.0179, 0.5771) 
Availability of other 
drug treatment 
-0.2346* 
(-0.4177, -0.0515) 
-0.0537 
(-0.1061, -0.0013)   
-0.2060 
(-0.3956, -0.0164) 
Treatment benefit 0.9747* 
(0.7707, 1.1786) 
 0.8618* 
(0.8084, 0.9151) 
0.6523* 
(0.4544, 0.8502) 
Improvements to everyday life 
No improvements 
to everyday 
activities 
-0.096 
(-0.1930, 0.0007) 
-0.0449 
(-0.0721, -0.0177) 
-0.1093* 
(-0.2009, -0.0177) 
Returns patient to 
everyday life 
0.8166* 
(0.6850, 0.9481) 
 
0.6499 
(0.6137, 0.6860) 
0.6757* 
(0.5437, 0.8077) 
Interaction Cost*Label 1.48e-05  
(-4.56e-07, 3.01e-05) 
1.98e-05  
(1.56e-05, 2.4e-05) 
1.15e-05 
(-2.66e-06, 2.56e-05) 
Constant -0.1462 
(-0.3302, 0.0378) 
-0.1437 
(-0.1980, -0.0893) 
-0.1341 
(-0.3428, 0.0747) 
 
 *significant at the 95% level  
  
32 
 
S2 Table. Sub-group analysis by socioeconomic status  
Attribute Coefficient 
(95% confidence interval) 
 Socioeconomic status 
ABC1 
Socioeconomic status 
C2DE 
Rare disease  -0.5766* 
(-0.6426, -0.5106) 
  -0.4454*  
(-0.5248, -0.3661)  
Cost of treatment  -2.59e-05* 
(-3.12e-05, -2.05e-05) 
-1.76e-05* 
(-2.36e-05, -1.16e-05) 
Debilitating and life 
threatening disease 
0.2379* 
(0.1543, 0.3214) 
0.0957 
(-0.0059, 0.1972)   
Availability of other drug 
treatment 
-0.0523 
(-0.1160, 0.0114) 
-0.1064*  
(-0.1821, -0.0307)  
Treatment benefit 0.9081* 
(0.8414, 0.9747) 
0.7830*   
(0.7077, 0.8582)  
Improvements to every day life 
No improvements to 
everyday activities 
-0.0366* 
(-0.0686, -0.0047) 
-0.0753* 
(-0.1160, -0.0346) 
Returns patients to 
everyday life 
0.7017* 
(0.6581, 0.7453) 
0.6081* 
(0.5555, 0.6608) 
Interaction Cost*Label 2.21e-05* 
(1.69e-05, 2.72e-05) 
1.44e-05*  
(8.61e-06, 2.02e-05) 
Constant -0.1849* 
(-0.2504, -0.1194) 
 -0.0862* 
(-0.1659, -0.0066) 
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S3 Table. Sub-group analysis by gender 
Attribute Coefficient 
(95% confidence interval) 
 Male Female 
Rare disease -0.5350* 
(-0.6095, -0.4605) 
-0.5090* 
(-0.5778, -0.4401) 
Cost of treatment  -2.16e-05* 
(-2.73e-05, -1.60e-05) 
-2.33e-05* 
(-2.89e-05, -1.76e-05) 
Debilitating and life 
threatening disease 
0.1684* 
(0.0731, 0.2637) 
0.1851* 
(0.0982, 0.2720) 
Availability of other drug 
treatment 
  -0.0982 
(-0.1675, -0.0289) 
-0.0483 
(-0.1165, 0.0199)  
Treatment benefit 0.8185* 
(0.7487, 0.8883) 
0.8928* 
(0.8213, 0.9644) 
Improvements to every day life 
No improvements to 
everyday activities 
-0.0637* 
(-0.0985, -0.0289) 
-0.0415* 
(-0.0780, -0.0050) 
Returns patients to 
everyday life 
  
Interaction Cost*Label 0.6108*   
(0.5632, 0.6584) 
0.7149*   
(0.6673, 0.7626) 
Constant  1.75e-05* 
(1.21e-05, 2.29e-05) 
2.04e-05* 
(1.49e-05, 2.59e-05) 
 
 
 
  
34 
 
S4 Table. Sub-group analysis by age 
Attribute Coefficient 
(95% confidence interval) 
 <50 years ≥50 years 
Rare disease -0.4767* 
(-0.5483, -0.4052) 
-0.5742* 
(-0.6461, -0.5023) 
Cost of treatment  -2.14e-05* 
(-2.68e-05, -1.59e-05) 
-2.36e-05* 
(-2.95e-05, -1.78e-05) 
Debilitating and life 
threatening disease 
0.2225* 
(0.1341, 0.3109) 
0.1332* 
(0.0388, 0.2276) 
Availability of other drug 
treatment 
-0.0661 
(-0.1328, 0.0007) 
-0.0847 
(-0.1564, -0.0131)  
Treatment benefit 0.8073* 
(0.7386, 0.8760) 
0.9159* 
(0.8429, 0.9889) 
Improvements to every day life 
No improvements to 
everyday activities 
-0.0474* 
(-0.0833, -0.0115) 
-0.0588* 
(-0.0940, -0.0237) 
Returns patients to 
everyday life 
  
Interaction Cost*Label 0.5616* 
(0.5165, 0.6066) 
 0.7795* 
                (0.7297, 0.8293) 
Constant  1.86e-05* 
(1.33e-05, 2.39e-05) 
1.93e-05* 
(1.36e-05, 2.49e-05) 
 
 
